workers and their households is indicated by its
effects of expanding the proportion of small firms in percent of total personal income in 1990 (U.S. Delocal economies, an empirical wage rate model inpartment of Commerce, 1991) . Theory-based hycorporating employer size was developed, and papotheses developed and tested in this article suggest rameters were estimated using household data from that employer size may affect average wage levels, rural Putnam County, Georgia. The estimates indias well as the distribution of wages across groups of cated that large employers offered higher wages than workers small employers and that the wage premium they Recently, researchers have found a strong positive offered was greater for blacks than for whites. These relationship between employer size and wage rates, results support Thomas Till's argument that southern though none of the studies focused on rural areas rural counties with relatively large blackpopulations (Brown and Medoff; Barron, Black , and Loewenshould not abandon efforts to attract large employstein). At the county level, Till found that industrial ers. Other factors associated with higher wages inrecruitment, generally associated with relatively eluded level of education, previous labor force large firms, brought substantial employment gains experience, and employment in certain occupations to southern rural counties with large black populaand industries.
tions during the 1960s and 1970s. Till's results suggest that "smokestack chasing" still remains a viable Key words: employer size, human capital, wage economic development strategy for some southern determination counties.
CState and local e c dt s s Previous rural wage studies focused on workers' tte local eonomi deelomen saeie human capital characteristics, rather than employer to promote locally owned, small businesses have size as wage determinants (Smith et al.; Scott, gained popularity in recent years in the United States i, and Rungeling). The present analysis in- (Eisinger) . In the South, several widely-circulated udes both workers' characteristics and employer reports on economic development have recomsize in an extended human capital model of wage mended small business development programs in determination. By using survey data from a single place of programs of industrial recruitment (Southco , te y uses on te effẽ ern Growth Policies Board; MDC. These recoicounty, the study focuses on the effects of characern Growth Policies Board; MDC). These recomteristics of workers and business establishments, mendations focus attention on creation of business teristics of workers and business establishments, mendations focus attention on creationapart from variations in the structure of local econoestablishments of smaller scale rather than the mies and the quality of education f branch plants attracted in the past by industrial recruitment programs. Unfortunately, little research The paper is organized in the following manner. is available for evaluating the wisdom of small
The next section describes the human capital apbusiness development as a primary strategy for proach to wage determination. The third section every type of community.
presents an empirical human capital wage model To aid in the evaluation of business development incorporating employer size. The fourth section destrategies, this paper analyzes the impact of emscribes the study area and the household-level data ployer size on rural wage rates. The importance of gathered for this analysis. The fifth section presents wage-related income in the economic well-being of regression results of the wage model. Conclusions and implications for rural development research and amount of education chosen is assumed to depend policy are discussed in the sixth section.
upon the net benefits which are captured in the rate of return. Because education is a cumulative proc-CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND ess, wages (Wis) of the ith individual vary by years Measurement of the wage impact of employer size of education (S = 1,...,N): requires a theoretical explanation of the wage deterAfter one year of education: Wi = Wio + riWiomination process. Numerous factors affect wage Wio(l+ri) rates, and when each of these factors is identified After two years of education: wi2 = wi + riWil = conceptually and accounted for statistically, it is Wio(l+ri) 2 possible to isolate the effects of a single factor such After three years of education: wi3 = W2 + riWi2 = as employer size. This section presents an overview Wio(l+ri) of neoclassical and human capital approaches to
In general, the wage of the ith individual with S wage determination as a conceptual foundation for years of education is given by an extended human capital model that is developed (2) W = Wi(1 + r)S in the following section.
In practice, individuals are not able to evaluate The neoclassical approach to wage rate determiIn practice, inividals ar e not able to evaluate nation is based on the theory of marginal productivunrealized educaity and on the theory of compe aria ti vtiveonal and job opportunities, and thus actual rates of are assumed to e price takers in labor markets etannot be calculated directly for the ith labor is paid according to its marginal product. In its worker; however, rates obf retu can b e estimatedr simplest form, neoclassical theory assumes that lacrw -sectionallyusg observed wages. r dworkers bor is a homogeneous input. While these assumpr s M cer dev tions are unrealistic in many circumstances,chooling model by expressing equaChamberlain, Cullen, and Lewin argued that the tion (2) in continuous terms, transforming it by logaChamberlain, Cullen, and Lewin argued that the rithms, and adding an error term: neoclassical approach has proven useful in predict-
ing central tendencies of labor markets.
Wi-p + sSi + ei Human capital theory extends the neoclassical where the intercept term 13 is the natural log of the wage determination model by recognizing producbase wage rate (Wo) for unskilled labor, and the tivity differences among labor inputs (Becker, regression coefficient ]P is an estimate of the annual 1975). Workers invest in education, training, health rate of return to education.' The error term ei is care, or migration in expectation of increasing their distributed lognormal. Using equation (3), estimated productivity. Firms, motivated by a desire to maxirates of return for male workers in the United States mize profits, reward productivity according to the have ranged from 6 to 20 percent (Fleisher and human capital of each worker.
Knieser; Mincer). The fundamental hypothesis of the human capital On-the-job training (OJT) also represents investtheory of wage determination states that ment in human capital (Mincer; Joll et al.) . Wage dWi models incorporating OJT are referred to in the (1) Wi = f(S), dS > 0 human capital literature as post-schooling models.
2
where Wi is the wage of the ith individual and Si is These models are of the following form years of education beyond the minimum standard set by law (Joll et al.) . An individual educated to the (4) In W i = Po+ PsS + JJi -iJJJ + e, legal minimum receives a base wage (Wio). While investing in noncompulsory education, the individwhere J is the number of years of OJT during a ual forfeits the base wage and thereby incurs pertraining period of n years and 3 j is a regression sonal costs. After being educated, the individual coefficient representing the rate of return. To allow receives a compensatory wage premium that reprefor diminishing marginal returns to OJT over the sents a return (ri) on his investment (Mincer) . The training period, the square of J is included, and 3 jj is IThe logarithmic transformation of equation (2) is given by In Wi = In Wo + Siln(l+ri) + lnpi. The subscript i on the base wage (Wio) is dropped because the base wage is now a cross-sectional average rather than a unique value for each individual. For econometric estimation, the logged intercept term is replaced by Bo. Mathematically, it can be shown that a logarithmic approximation of the term, Siln(l+ri), is given by riSi. Because the rate of return (ri) is now a parameter to be estimated, it is represented in equation (3) a regression coefficient used to adjust the rate of costs (MOCL) associated with each unit of labor, the return, marginal resource cost of labor is given by MRCL = WL + MOCL.
A HUMAN CAPITAL WAGE MODEL
As the firm hires more labor, MOCL rises at an INCORPORATING EMPLOYER SIZE increasing rate, raising MRCL and reducing the quantity of labor demanded. The firm facing moniCritics have identified numerous limitations of the toring costs is in equilibrium when it hires L units human capital approach to labor markets (Fischer of labor at a marginal resource cost equal to 2 . and Nijkamp). A central focus of these criticisms is
Other explanations of a positive relationship bethe lack of attention to institutional factors and martee employer size and wages focus on instituket imperfections in the basic neoclassical approach. t factors, particularly the desire of employers to In response to these criticisms, empirical studies of aoi nionization of workers. It is argued that large wage rates oftnncrpraeacadeavoid unionization of workers. It is argued that large wage rates often incorporate race and gender variemployers attempt to sweeten labor relations by ables to allow for possible discrimination in labor offering higher wages to minimize their workers markets (Joll et al.) . For example, human capital interest in unionization (Freeman and Medoff) theory has been extended to explain the wage effects potentially important feature of small businesses A potentially important feature of small businesses of race and gender as the expression of employers' is self-employment. On conceptual grounds, Solotaste for discrimination (Becker 1957) . If such tastes mo suggests that business owners may receive exist, employers may systematically offer certain ps c nome nonpecuniary rewards) from the worke groups, such as women and blacks, wages psychic income (nonpecuniary rewards) from the worker groups, such as women and blacks, wages independence associated with self-employment and that are lower than the value of the marginal product may therefore be willing to accept wages lower than of labor (VMPL).
may therefore be willing to accept wages lower thañ of labor (VMPOL)~.
^they would accept when working for someone else. In the empirical literature, wage determination
In sparse rural economies with few employment models often adjust for industry and occupation opportunities, business owners may accept relaeffects (Brown and Medoff) . Industry and occupatively low wages from self-employment because of tion may capture differences in working conditions the costs incurred in commuting to higher paying that are difficult to measure directly. If capital-labor employment. ratios differ by industry and occupation on average, An extended human capital wage model incorpoapplication of marginal productivity theory indirating employer size and other wage determinants cates that wages will vary across industry and occudiscussed above is given by pational categories. diseconomies of size in the monitoring of employees, Stigler and Oi argue that large firms place a + L 18 RACi + P19SEMPi + ei premium on workers who are willing to be trained where EDi is the ith individual's years of schooling, and conform to rigid job requirements and hence PEXi is years of previous work experience; PEXSQi "monitor themselves." To fill their ranks with highly is the square of previous experience; TENi is years disciplined workers, large firms are willing to pay of tenure at the current job; TENSQi is the square of higher wages than small firms (Idson and Feaster) . tenure; SIZi is establishment size, expressed in terms Figure 1 illustrates the effects of monitoring costs of number of employees; the remaining symbols on the marginal resource cost of labor (MRCL) for a represent dummy variables: OCCi is occupation, firm in a competitive labor market. At a wage rate INDi is industry, GENi is gender, RACi is race, and equal to Ci, the firm would hire L 1 labor units if there SEMPi is self-employment. 3 Definitions of the variwere no monitoring costs. If there are monitoring ables are given in Table 1. 3Equation (5) is of log-log form, though most of the terms on the right-hand side do not explicitly contain the log expression. The intercept is an implicit log. In the human capital variables, EDi, PEXi, TENi, PEXSQi, and TENSQi, the explicit log expression drops out in the manner shown for education in footnote 1 (the log also drops out in the squared terms, as shown in Joll et al.) . As is customary in log-log models, the dummy variables OCCi, INDi, GENi, RACi, and SEMPi) are not logged since the log does not exist when the variable is equal-to zero. Employer size (SIZi) is the only right-hand side variable in which the log appears explicitly. Work experience, a proxy for on-the-job training, males (GENi) are expected to have higher wages on is segmented into two categories in equation (5) to average than nonwhites and females. Lower wages allow for differing rates of return, following an from self-employment (SEMPi) are anticipated in approach used in previous studies (Mellow; Idson comparison with wages for outside employment. and Feaster; Smith et al.) . The first category, years of tenure in the worker's current job (TENi), is CHARACTERISTICS OFTHE intended to measure the effects of training specific REGION AND SAMPLE to the current job and is obtained directly from the Putnam County, Georgia, is a rural community household survey described in the next section. The located 50 miles southwest of Atlanta in the northsecond variable, previous experience (PEXi), is incentral part of the state. The county was chosen for tended to measure all other productivity-enhancing this study because of its rural location, its relatively skills that the worker has acquired in the work place. low per capita income, its relatively high proportion As in many other wage studies, a synthetic experiof blacks in total population, and the rapidly declinence variable is constructed since detailed informaing relative importance of agriculture as a source of tion on work history was not available. PEXi is thus employment and income in the local economy. calculated by subtracting years of formal education, Putnam County had an estimated population of job tenure, and six pre-school years from the 12,800 in 1988. Eatonton, the county seat and largest worker's age. city, had a population of 7,370. Income in Putnam The conceptual discussion above provides a basis County remains well below state and national averfor formulating hypotheses concerning the effects of ages, though the gap has narrowed in recent years. the dependent variables in equation (5). The three In 1988, per capita income was 69.5 percent of the human capital variables, years of education (EDi), U.S. average and 75.1 percent of the Georgia averexperience previous to current job (PEXi), and tenage (Bachtel) . Blacks represented 41.7 percent of ure in current job (TENi), are hypothesized to have Putnam's total population in 1988. a positive effect on the wage rate. A negative relaMajor changes have occurred in the industrial tionship is anticipated between wages and the structure of Putnam County over the past two decsquared terms for previous work experience (PEXades. As shown in Table 2 , the relative importance SQi) and job tenure (TENSQi). A positive relationof agriculture, forestry, and manufacturing has deship is expected between employer size (SIZi) and dined, while the relative importance of service and wages. For variables related to occupation (OCC i ) government sectors has grown. Between 1969 and and industry (INDi), it is hypothesized that wage 1988, the share of agriculture and forestry in total rates differ across categories. Whites (RAC) and earnings fell from 14.6 percent to 4.3 percent. Manu Putnam County with national level estimates by heads of households were black and 59 were white.
Mincer. Second, the extended human capital wage This is approximately the current ratio of blacks to model in equation (5) was used to obtain estimates whites in the county. Characteristics of heads of of the wage rate effects of employer size and other households in the sample are presented by race in conceptually justified wage determinants. Third, in Table 3 . The relatively large gap in wages of blacks teraction terms were introduced into equation (5) to and whites is of particular interest in this study, test hypotheses concerning race and gender differbecause evaluation of the Till hypothesis requires ences in the effects of employer size. adjusting the racial wage gap for employer size and Regression results of the wage models, shown in other wage determinants. Without such adjustment, Table 4 , generally conformed to expectations. Sigthe average wage of blacks is 61.4 percent of the nificance of the estimated coefficients was evaluated average wage of whites in the sample. This estimate using a two-tailed t-test. The estimated base wage is nearly identical to one of 61.0 percent obtained by for a worker with no optional education in Putnam 89 The absence of additional wage benefits for years of rate of return to education was 7.0 percent and the current-job tenure suggest that little investment in R-squared value of his model was 0.067. Both in job-specific training occurred in Putnam County. In Mincer's study and in the present study, Model One contrast, Mellow's analysis of a sample drawn from explained less than 7 percent in total variation of all U.S. workers indicated that the rate of return for wages.
an additional year at the current job was three times A much greater proportion of the variation in the higher than for a year of previous experience. log of wages was explained by Model Two. The
The coefficient of employer size (SIZi) was posimodel appeared to fit the data well, as indicated by tive, as anticipated, and significant at the 1 percent an adjusted R-squared value of 0.76. The antilog of level. Because employer size entered the model as a the intercept, the base wage rate (po in equation 3) log and the dependent variable was a log, the regresfor workers who were white, male, employed in a sion coefficient indicates the proportionate impact managerial or professional job in manufacturing, that employer size had on wages. The estimated and not self-employed, was $4.44. Education had a value of the employer size coefficient in Model Two positive and significant effect on wages with an indicated that, in a cross-employer comparison, douestimated rate of return of 2.62 percent. This estibling employer size was associated with a 12 percent mate lies between Mellow's 4.27 estimated rate of wage increase. Ceteris paribus, the predicted wage return for U.S. workers in all industries and Gunter's of a worker earning $8.00 per hour in an estab-2.6 percent for hired farm labor in Georgia.
lishment employing 50 workers would have risen to The positive coefficient on experience (PEXi) and $8.96 per hour in an establishment employing 100 the negative coefficient on experience squared workers. (PEXSQi) were each significant at the 1 percent
The coefficients of all five occupational categories level. The estimated rate of return of 2.9 percent for (OCCi) were negative and three were significant. a year of work experience is greater than the rate of The base occupation, the managerial and profesreturn of 2.6 for an additional year of education. This sional category, had a higher wage than the other comparison suggests that workers who were already categories. Three of the five industry categories (INDi) had wages that were significantly higher than were 45.8 percent less than average wages of men. manufacturing, the base industry in the model.
-------(Numbers of Household Heads) ----------
Because this study focused on the employer sizeThe coefficient of race (RACi) was negative and wage relationship, no attempt was made to explain significant at the 5 percent level. The value of the the race and gender-related differentials. It is possicoefficient indicated that, on average, blacks reble that a portion of these differentials was related ceived wages that were 14.4 percent lower than to labor market discrimination. Testing for discrimiwages of whites. The coefficient of gender (GEN) nation requires more detailed specification of prowas also negative and significant. When calculated ductivity differences among workers than permitted as a proportionate impact, average wages of women by the data in this study. 5 For example, previous 4
The proportionate effect of a dummy variable in a log-log model, such as equation (5), is calculated by taking the antilog of the estimated coefficient and subtracting one.
5 A survey of the literature on wage discrimination is found in Marshall. studies suggest that time spent out of the labor force Table  a Indicates percent change in wages associated with a 1 4. All variables that were significant in Model Two percent increase in employer size, measured by number remained significant in Model Three. Except for of employees. variables included in interaction terms in Model Three, the estimated coefficients changed little in wage gap between blacks and whites. In a comparimagnitude. At the 1 percent level, an F-test revealed son of simple averages, the average wage te for joint significance of the estimated coefficients of blacks was 61.4 percent of the average for whites. employer (SIZE) and the employer size-race interAfter accounting for productivity differences, firm action term (SIZ x RAC). As shown in Table 5 , the size, and industry and occupation effects, the averproportionate wage impact of employer size was age wage rate of blacks was 14.4 percent less than considerably larger for blacks than for whites. In a the average for whites. The results suggest that this cross-employer comparison, a doubling of employer remaining wage gap between whites and blacks was size was associated with a 21.9 percent wage in related to employer size. A separate regression increase for blacks and a 9.50 percent increase for corporating interaction between employer size and whites. 6 In fact, the racial wage gap disappeared i race indicates that the wage differential associated finrs with 30 or more employees.
with race disappeared as employer size increased. An F-test indicated that the estimated coefficients Southern rural economic development strategies, of employer size (SIZE) and the employer size-genpreviously focused almost exclusively on industrial der interaction term (GEN x SIZ) were also jointly recruitment of large employers, have now shifted significant at the 1 percent level. The proportionate toward small business creation and expansion, based wage impact of employer size was slightly larger for partly on the recommendation of several recent, females than for males. Table 5 shows that, on widely-read reports (Southern Growth Policies average, a doubling of employer size was associated Board; MDC). The results of this study support Till's with a wage increase of 16.4 percent for women and argument that industrial recruitment may remain a 14.0 percent for men. Because the rate of increase viable rural development strategy for at least some in wages with respect to employer size was only southern counties, particularly counties with a proslightly higher for women than for men, the gender portionately large black population. In the case of wage gap did not disappear as firm size increased.
Putnam County, expanding the share of small establishments, at least those with less than 30 employees, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS may increase the nonproductivity wage differential This study analyzed the effects of employer size between blacks and whites. On the other hand, exand worker characteristics on rural wages in Putnam panding the share of establishments with 30 or more County, Georgia. Regression estimates indicate that employees appears to offer wage advantages to all employer size was positively related to average workers regardless of race, gender, and levels of wage rates of workers after adjustment for other human capital. wage determinants. In addition to employer size, While the geographic sample frame of this study level of education and previous work experience is limited to Putnam County, previous research uwere positively associated with wage rate. Industry, nanimously supports the conclusion that average gender, and race also explained part of the variation wage rates increase with employer size. Other studin wages. Of particular interest in this study was the ies have not focused on the employer size-race 6
Calculation of the proportionate impact of employer size must take account of the effects of race and gender due to the interaction terms. Since the regression is log-linear in form, the proportionate impact is given by the total partial derivative of the log of wages with respect to the log employer size: d(lnW) d ) = PSIZ + 2 (PsIZxRAC XRAC) + 2(PSIZxGENXoEN ). d (lnXsrz) interaction, found to be significant in Putnam gies but that other criteria are also valid. A complete County, and further research is required to determine evaluation of employer size-specific strategies for whether this interaction occurs in other geographic economic development should examine flows of areas. For policy purposes, it would also be valuable capital income and backward linkages. Small estabto compare the effects of employer size across rural lishments compared to large establishments may and urban areas.
offer non-wage advantages, such as greater local In interpreting the results of this study, it should be retention of business profits and more local purchase recognized that the wage rate is an important criteof intermediate inputs. rion for evaluating economic development strate-
